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Research on buyer–supplier relationships has debated the advantages and disadvan-
tages of embedded relationships. We join this debate by developing theory on the per-
formance implications of relaxing embedded buyer–supplier relationships for a
limited period of time—a previously neglected phenomenon we refer to as temporary
deembedding. To capture this phenomenon's dynamic and complex nature, we use a
combined-method approach. First, we conducted a longitudinal case study of the rela-
tionship between Nissan and a strategic first-tier supplier. This case study suggests
that temporary deembedding reinvigorates search and leads to higher performance for
both the buyer and supplier. Second, we built a computational simulation model using
the search perspective from complexity theory to complement the theory grounded in
our case study. Our simulations confirm the case findings while shedding additional
light on how frequency, duration, and intensity of deembedding affect supply chain
performance.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Supply chain management is inherently complex and dynamic
(Nair, Narasimhan, & Choi, 2009), because decisions made
by one member of the supply chain affect subsequent deci-
sions of other actors. In this dynamic and complex setting,
the existence of an “optimized” master plan proves elusive.
Instead, supply chain members engage in coevolutionary search
to advance and to innovate (Chandrasekaran, Linderman,
Sting, & Benner, 2015; Giannoccaro, 2011; Kim, Choi, &
Skilton, 2015; Levinthal, 1997; Sting & Loch, 2016), much
like BMW's ongoing “Industrie 4.0” initiative to digitalize
manufacturing processes and technologies. As part of this
initiative, BMW has scanned its entire Rolls Royce plant in
Goodwood, UK, within a two-millimeter tolerance. Supply
chain gains from such firm-level improvements, however,
critically depend on suppliers' compatible interfaces. BMW
COO Zispe reflects: “How will our suppliers connect with
these emerging systems?” (Mayer & Klein, 2015). This quote
illustrates how pivotal buyer–supplier relationships are for
supply chain innovation and performance (Chen & Paulraj,
2004; Choi & Kim, 2008; Kim et al., 2015; Terpend, Tyler,
Krause, & Handfield, 2008). Surprisingly, however, little is
known about how buyer–supplier relationships affect coevo-
lutionary search processes, let alone how these processes
subsequently drive supply chain performance—the main
motivation for this study.
Prior research has shown that closely embedded buyer–
supplier relationships foster joint problem-solving activities
and information exchange (Dyer & Chu, 2000; Dyer &
Singh, 1998; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), which,
in turn, boost buyer performance (e.g., Cachon & Lariviere,
2005; Choi & Kim, 2008; Chopra & Meindl, 2007; Kim
et al., 2015). Yet, embedded relationships can also trigger
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complacency, limit access to nonredundant information, and
lead to poor performance for both the buyer and supplier
(Swink & Zsidisin, 2006; Villena, Revilla, & Choi, 2011).
Consequently, prior research has often advised a constant,
moderate degree of embeddedness in buyer–supplier relation-
ships (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Swink & Zsidisin, 2006;
Villena et al., 2011; Zhou, Zhang, Sheng, Xie, & Bao, 2014).
Despite these advances, current research has three shortcom-
ings.1 First, the main focus has been on the buyer's perspec-
tive, thus forfeiting a more complete picture of relationship
performance for both parties (e.g., Carey, Lawson, & Krause,
2011; Cousins, Handfield, Lawson, & Petersen, 2006; Cous-
ins & Menguc, 2006; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Lawson, Tyler, &
Cousins, 2008; Villena et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2014). Sec-
ond, perhaps stemming from a strong reliance on cross-
sectional research designs, studies often overlook the fact that
a relationship's level of embeddedness can change over time
(for a few exceptions, see Azoulay, Repenning, & Zuckerman,
2010, Jap & Anderson, 2007, Saavedra, Reed-Tsochas, &
Uzzi, 2008). Such a static view of buyer–supplier relation-
ships limits our understanding of how these relationships
evolve and how different periods in this evolution affect the
relationship's search and performance. Third, a prevalent
underlying assumption is that an unmalleable relationship
structure pegs performance outcomes—an approach that disre-
gards the critical agency aspects of relationships that are delib-
erately and strategically altered by either party.
Consider Nissan, which cut the embedded ties with its
keiretsu suppliers in 1999, many having been affiliated with
Nissan since the 1950s (Aoki & Lennerfors, 2013; Stevens,
MacDuffie, & Helper, 2015). This was a deliberate, strategic
choice as part of the so-called “Nissan Revival Plan” (NRP),
announced on October 18, 1999. Likewise, five years after
deembedding, Nissan decided to rebuild close relationships
with several of its suppliers. This illustrates that the static,
deterministic conceptualization of buyer–supplier relation-
ships in prior research neglects the fact that firms can strategi-
cally relax, and later reinstate, embedded ties—a phenomenon
we refer to as temporary deembedding. Developing a theory
for temporary deembedding is our goal.
To this end, we employ a combined-method research
design—a prerequisite for a broader understanding of complex
supply chain management phenomena (Boyer & Swink, 2008).
First, we collected longitudinal and dyadic data at Nissan and a
strategic first-tier supplier over a 12-year timespan. We exam-
ine how the relationship's embeddedness evolved over time
and how that evolution interacted with search and performance.
We observe that when the relationship was overembedded,
both firms were limited to only incremental improvement ini-
tiatives that proved insufficient in breaking the relationship's
deadlock that was freezing each firm's innovative potential.
Deembedding, in contrast, shifted priority to intrafirm goals
over interfirm goals, reinvigorating both Nissan's and the sup-
plier's independent search initiatives. Thus, deembedding
helped the supply chain to escape its sticking point. Notably,
five years after the abrupt commencement of its deembedding
effort, Nissan opted to reembed supply chain ties in order to
ensure compatibility among independent search initiatives.
Secondly, to generalize and augment the theory emerging
from the case study, we devised a computational model to
simulate deembedding in supply chains. The model uses the
search notion of complexity theory where a supply chain
gradually explores a rugged performance landscape in search
of improvement and innovation. Generalizing the case find-
ings, we show that temporarily deembedding supply chain
relationships enhances performance by promoting broader
search for improvements in complex environments. Never-
theless, deembedding can be a double-edged sword: an
intense cut reinvigorates search, but too frequent or pro-
longed cutting of ties leads to incompatible outcomes that
can hamper supply chain performance.
We offer several contributions to research on buyer–
supplier relationships. First, we investigate the phenomenon
of temporary deembedding and develop theory on how it
affects supply chain performance. This is important because
prevailing research advises balanced degrees of embedded-
ness (e.g., Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Villena et al., 2011; Zhou et al.,
2014), while largely ignoring the question of how an ideal bal-
ance can be achieved. We address this issue by proposing a
dynamic balance. More specifically, we argue that the level of
embeddedness can be altered dynamically over time to reinvi-
gorate supply chain innovation and performance. Second, we
integrate supply chain embeddedness with complexity theory
and its fundamental notion of search. The search perspective
offers new theoretical insights on the outcomes of buyer–
supplier relationships that go beyond the current explanations
based on transaction cost economics (e.g., Williamson, 1985),
the relational view (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998), and social net-
work theory (e.g., Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Uzzi, 1996, 1997).
Third, we propose an agency view of buyer–supplier relation-
ships. This view qualifies extant approaches that consider
these relationships as either relatively stable (e.g., Villena
et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2014) or as following a presaged
course (e.g., Jap & Anderson, 2007; Vanpoucke, Vereecke, &
Boyer, 2014). Instead, we explicitly recognize the agency of
firms in deliberately and strategically tuning their relation-
ships. Supply chain researchers can benefit from this fresh
agency viewpoint, because it sheds light on the pivotal role of
endogenous changes in buyer–supplier relationships.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
Complexity theory, with its central notion of search (Cyert &
March, 1963), describes how organizations generate innovations
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when facing high complexity (Levinthal & March, 1993;
Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005), that is, when many choices
interact in nonsimple ways (Simon, 1962). Supply chains
exemplify such complexity because numerous decisions
interact among supply chain members, and organizations
cannot fully oversee or understand, let alone globally optimize,
all decisions simultaneously (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999).
Instead, organizations dynamically explore the landscape of
possible actions in an evolutionary, path-dependent search
process. While search processes have been discussed in
complex manufacturing and high-tech settings (e.g., Chan-
drasekaran et al., 2015; Sting & Loch, 2016), to the best of
our knowledge this lens has not been applied to supply chain
embeddedness. Given the dynamic, coevolutionary, and com-
plex nature of buyer–supplier relationships, this omission is
surprising because the strength of such relationships is likely
to affect the way supply chain members search jointly (Kim
et al., 2015).
Buyer–supplier collaboration and knowledge exchange
were shown to be key in managing complexity (Kim et al.,
2015). Such relationships can vary from strongly to weakly
embedded. Embeddedness strength is shaped by structural,
relational, and cognitive factors. Structural factors include
joint projects, operational assistance, and cross sharehold-
ings (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991). Relational elements encom-
pass friendship, goodwill, and respect (Uzzi, 1996, 1997).
Cognitive factors consist of shared meaning, expectations,
and vision (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).
We investigate the phenomenon of temporary deembed-
ding of buyer–supplier relationships defined as relaxing
embeddedness for a limited period of time. Temporary
deembedding thus implies the dissolution and subsequent
resumption of embedded ties. This concept does not denote
the state of a relationship but, rather, a process of deliber-
ately altering the relationship. In this way, temporary deem-
bedding advances prior research by offering a dynamic and
malleable viewpoint.
To delineate the nomological network of embeddedness
and temporary deembedding, we reviewed related concepts
such as reciprocal interdependence (Thompson, 1967), near
decomposability (Simon, 1962), weak ties (Granovetter,
1973), and loose coupling (Orton & Weick, 1990). Reciprocal
interdependence refers to one party's decisions influencing
another party's decisions; near decomposability entails the
grouping of decisions that are strongly interdependent. These
concepts thus tally strengths of interdependence in a system,
whereas embeddedness describes relationship strength. As such,
embeddedness is composed of structural (e.g., concentration of
business and equity stakes), relational (e.g., frequency of inter-
action), and cognitive (e.g., shared norms) dimensions. Loose
versus tight coupling refers solely to the degree of operational
integration, hereby capturing only the structural dimension of
embeddedness (for a recent discussion, see Kim et al., 2015).
Therefore, embeddedness uniquely offers sufficient conceptual
breadth. What is more, embeddedness, coupling, and tie
strength all denote merely the state of a buyer–supplier relation-
ship, while deembedding refers to changing it. In the following
sections, we develop theory on temporary deembedding.
3 | CASE SELECTION AND
METHOD
We conducted a longitudinal, inductive case study of the
relationship between Nissan and one of its strategic first-tier
suppliers (referred to as “the supplier”) during the period
1999–2012.2 Our unit of analysis is the relationship between
Nissan and the supplier. Our approach allowed us to trace
different periods of embeddedness in real time while asses-
sing the improvement and performance implications for both
the buyer and the supplier.
3.1 | Case selection
We identified Nissan as a critical setting (Barratt, Choi, &
Li, 2011), because Nissan deliberately and publicly adjusted
the level of embeddedness with its suppliers during the
period of our study. This adjustment targeted its entire sup-
ply base: Nissan purposefully discontinued the “Japanese
way” of managing supplier relationships—a practice that has
played a prominent role in the literature on close coordina-
tion and that had received admiration since the 1980s when
Japanese carmakers overtook their American counterparts.
We selected one supplier across different embedding
periods in order to gain in-depth understanding of one tem-
porary deembedding process. Furthermore, we selected the
supplier ourselves rather than asking Nissan, in order to
avoid social desirability bias. Because we assured anonymity
to the supplier, we cannot disclose the component delivered
by the supplier. Our sampling criterion was that both compa-
nies had to view their relationship as strategic. First, from
Nissan's perspective, the supplied component's strategic rele-
vance is reflected by its “just-in-time” and “in-sequence”
delivery from colocated supplier factories directly to Nissan's
production line. Also, the business volume between Nissan
and the supplier has been substantial throughout our research
period. During the period preceding the NRP, the supplier
accounted for approximately one third of Nissan's domestic
demand for this particular component. Moreover, there is a
direct interface between the end user of the car and the com-
ponent, which has an important impact on driving experience.
Second, from the supplier's perspective, Nissan was its most
important customer. During the 1990s, Nissan accounted for
one third of the supplier's production volume.
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To encourage supplier interviewees to talk freely, we did
not mention their company's name during our interviews
with Nissan, choosing instead to query Nissan interviewees
about all three main suppliers of the component in question.
The length and in-depth nature of our interviews enabled us
to gather sufficient information from Nissan about our focal
supplier.
3.2 | Data collection
Our data consist of official company reports of both Nissan
and the supplier; patent data; as well as coverage in the media
and business press. To better understand deembedding at the
systemic level, we gathered such data also from other Nissan
suppliers. We collected these data continuously from the
announcement of the NRP in 1999 up to 2012. In addition,
we conducted face-to-face interviews over a 12-year period.
At both Nissan and at the supplier, we interviewed key
employees central to the relationship—several times when
needed. With the exception of Renault-Nissan's CEO Carlos
Ghosn, all interviewees spoke on the condition of strict ano-
nymity. Table 1 provides a summary of our interviews.
These interviews were conducted by the second author
who is fluent in Japanese. The interviews with CEO Carlos
Ghosn and one non-Japanese Nissan employee were con-
ducted in English in Japan. Two senior executives and three
senior purchasing managers were interviewed in English
in France. All other interviews were conducted in Japan in
Japanese. We designed the interview protocol in English and
translated it into Japanese. A native Japanese speaker trans-
lated the protocol back into English to fix minor issues. The
duration of the semistructured interviews varied between
30 min and 5 hr, leaving ample room for new topics to arise.
Most interviews were taped, and all taped interviews were
transcribed verbatim the same day. When interviewees
declined to be taped, detailed interview notes were taken.
Japanese interviews were translated into English by the inter-
viewing author with a Japanese native speaker subsequently
TABLE 1 Overview of interviews
Company Interviewee Date Length (hr) Location
Data collection
FTF Note Rec FT
Nissan Senior manager October 2, 2001 2:00 Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Middle manager October 10, 2001 1:00 Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Two middle managers October 30, 2001 2:15 Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Member of the board November 14, 2001 2:00 Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
December 5, 2002 2:00 Japan ✓ ✓
December 18, 2005 2:00 Japan ✓ ✓
August 18, 2008 2:00 Japan ✓ ✓
September 15, 2012 2:30 Japan ✓ ✓
CEO Carlos Ghosn November 26, 2001 0:45 Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Senior manager December 2, 2002 1:00 Japan ✓ ✓
Member of the board December 18, 2002 1:00 Japan ✓ ✓
Senior executive February 20, 2008 1:00 France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Senior executive February 21, 2008 0:30 France ✓
Senior purchasing manager March 26,2008 1:00 France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
April 10, 2008 0:30 France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Senior purchasing manager April 10, 2008 1:00 France ✓ ✓
Senior purchasing manager April 28,2008 1:30 France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Senior purchasing manager July 21, 2008 2:00 Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Supplier Two account managers (one of these two) December 8, 2001 5:00 Japan ✓ ✓
July 11, 2002 3:00 Japan ✓ ✓
September 23, 2008 4:00 Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Member of the board, Nissan tenseki (envoy) April 14, 2008 3:00 France ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Three account managers September 23, 2008 2:00 Japan ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Note. FT: full transcript made from recording; FTF: face-to-face interview; Note: extensive notes taken during the interview; Rec: full recording made of interview.
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double-checking the translations of the main episodes of the
recordings. Any unclear content was resolved during subse-
quent meetings or through follow-up phone calls or emails.
3.3 | Data analysis
Our interest in embeddedness took hold when learning
through the media of Nissan's deembedding moves in 1999.
As a first step, our study analyzed Nissan's public announce-
ments as well as media coverage of the NRP. Recurring men-
tion of “destruction of the keiretsu” and references to Ghosn
as the “keiretsu killer” pointed us to extant research on the
keiretsu approach to organizing the supply chain (e.g., Dyer,
1996; Nishiguchi, 1994; Sako & Helper, 1998). Based on
these sources and our interest in supply chain relationship per-
formance, we drafted our interview protocol of semistructured
questions (see Appendix A). Our aim was to capture all main
dimensions of buyer–supplier relations while allowing enough
room for elaboration as well as the introduction of new topics
by our interviewees. Apart from data about the pre-NRP
period, all information was collected in real time. We asked
respondents about the period “before 1999” during all inter-
view rounds. We compared the responses given in each
period about the pre-1999 period with each other and found
no noticeable differences, implying that retrospective error is
not a concern with respect to our understanding of this period.
The initial analysis of our interview data revealed two
major triggering events that “bracket” the different periods of
our study (Langley, 1999). The first triggering event was the
announcement of the NRP by Ghosn on October 18, 1999.
During this speech, Ghosn made a sharp distinction between
what had prevailed in the past and what would come in the
future, indicating that Nissan was at a turning point. The sec-
ond triggering event arose on November 18, 2004, when
Ghosn at a meeting with suppliers expressed his renewed
appreciation of keiretsu. These two triggering events segment
our data set into three periods that each indicates different
levels of embeddedness: (a) pre-NRP during which we found
the relation between Nissan and its supplier to be closely
embedded; (b) 2000–2004 when Nissan effectively deem-
bedded the relationship; and (c) the period from 2004 onward
when attempts at reembedding were undertaken.
We proceeded with an in-depth analysis of each of these
periods. Following Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton (2012), we
first relied on “open coding” by adhering closely to informant
terms. We grouped similar remarks together to come to our
first-order codes. In the next step, we axially coded these
informant-centric first-order codes, resulting in our second-
order codes that capture commonalities in our first-order
codes. We proceeded to substantive coding of our data into
aggregate dimensions, using concepts from the buyer–supplier
relationships and search literature as a point of reference.
4 | CASE FINDINGS
This section discusses the three embeddedness periods:
(a) embedding, (b) deembedding, and (c) reembedding. We
also detail the two triggering events that mark these periods,
describing the relationship and the outcomes for both Nissan
and the supplier.
4.1 | Before NRP: Embedded relationship
4.1.1 | Relationship
A well-known characteristic of the keiretsu approach is share-
holding in suppliers; a system-wide practice also followed by
Nissan (Cusumano, 1985). Our case is no exception: in the pre-
NRP period Nissan held a 20% equity stake in the supplier.
Figure 1 depicts Nissan's ownership in the supplier as well as in
20 other strategic first-tier keiretsu suppliers. We observe that
Nissan's average equity ownership in any of its suppliers did
not change drastically before the NRP. Another characteristic of
the keiretsu system is the colocation of supplier factories with
buyer factories. Our case also exemplifies this practice, and the
first plant and headquarters of the supplier were built in the
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FIGURE 1 Nissan's equity ownership in
20 strategic suppliers. Shaded area indicates the
SD of ownership. Dotted line represents equity in
our case supplier. Data were retrieved from
Nissan's and suppliers' official company
documents
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direct vicinity of a Nissan factory. As the relationship evolved,
Nissan assisted the supplier in opening colocated production
facilities at all of Nissan's six domestic mass production plants.
Also, Nissan dedicated senior purchasing managers to serving
ties with each of its affiliated suppliers. When nearing retirement,
these purchasing managers moved from Nissan to comfortable
positions at these suppliers—a practice known in Japan as tenseki.
This practice helped Nissan because the senior purchasers would
switch to the supplier's payroll, while the supplier benefitted from
the close ties with Nissan of these ex-Nissan envoys. Having
assigned purchasing managers to a supplier firm rather than to a
component group often incentivized Nissan purchasers to cham-
pion “their supplier”. Suppliers, in turn, invested heavily in ensur-
ing that “their buyer” remained closely tied to them. By meeting
for after-hours drinks, dinner, or overnight trips (including trips
abroad), and through personal gifts from the supplier, work duties
and social lives became deeply entangled.
We also observed that Nissan and the supplier referred to the
supplier as Nissan-kei (Nissan group).3 In addition, the keiretsu
practice of referring to Nissan as oyagaisha (parent firm) or oya-
bun (parent part) and to the supplier as kogaisha (child firm) or
kobun (child part) was used. Amplifying the family analogy,
Nissan's wholly owned supplier was dubbed Nissan's first wife,
while the supplier called itself Nissan's second wife (using
English terms). The usage of familial terms signaled a far-
reaching commitment where each party internalized a prescribed
relationship-serving role to enact. To illustrate, our interviewees
reflected on the keiretsu period with comments such as “this is
the way it always has been,” or “we simply belong to Nissan.”
4.1.2 | Improvement and innovation initiatives
Nissan's focus was improving manufacturing excellence as a
goal for its supply chain relationships in themselves, expect-
ing suppliers to improve exclusively through joint, incre-
mental process advancements (kaizen). In case of the focal
supplier, it would first be awarded a specific contract and
subsequently be expected to achieve cost reduction targets—
all within the dominant design and in concert with Nissan.
Informants at both sides of the relationship reported joint
improvement initiatives, noting that such improvement ini-
tiatives delivered incremental outcomes (i.e., adapting to
smooth out existing problems in the production system)
rather than radical or proactive ones (i.e., generating ideas
that would advance the supplier's technological capabilities).
Cross-organizational improvement teams staffed by senior
individuals from both partners focused on retaining harmony
(wa) rather than on generating radical ideas. Thus, joint efforts
were geared toward preserving the dominant design at a loss
of momentum as reflected by the supply chain products' repu-
tation of “smelling of old men”—an image often cited by our
interviewees both at the supplier and at Nissan.
Our interviewees at the supplier stressed that during the
embedded period, they were obliged to obey their “parent”
and follow its course. This, in turn, relieved the supplier of
making strategic decisions such as which technologies or
markets to pursue. A manager at the supplier diagnosed the
technological standstill in the following way:
With shigarami [strong bonds] in keiretsu, it is
really hard to create new technology, and this is
needed to win in the new market. Shigarami
inhibits progress.
At the systemic level, internal supplier championing at Nis-
san frequently led to the rejection of new suppliers and tech-
nologies by Nissan's purchasing department (Sugiyama, 2002).
Beyond the focal relationship, this “lock-in” was evidenced by
Nissan's refusal during its downturn to change its supply base
in terms of the number of suppliers. This was the case even
when production at its seven domestic factories dropped to
about 50% of capacity during the 1990s. Illustrating this point,
a senior executive at Nissan described the snares of the grid-
lock into which both Nissan and its supplier were trapped:
The pre-99 situation was unsustainable in its
coziness and inefficiency because of a lack of
tension—it was far too comfortable. There was
no tension to promote performance improve-
ment. In a situation where relationships will be
too long-term, there are barriers to entry for some
of the new suppliers or more agile suppliers. Can
you imagine in this situation […] the sourcing of
components in low-cost countries, or leading-
cost countries? It would not have happened
because there is no drive—no impetus to change.
One startling drawback of this combined technological and
relational lock-in was Nissan forgoing the technological
opportunity of hybrid electric engines. Main rival Toyota
had launched the hybrid electric Prius in Japan in 1997, but
Nissan did not have the required capabilities in-house, nor in
its keiretsu, to enter this market.4
Ultimately, Nissan's embedded supplier relationships coin-
cided with poor efficiency and slowing growth. For example,
Ghosn said during our 2001 interview that a benchmark study of
component prices revealed that Nissan had been paying 20–25%
more for its parts than its alliance partner Renault. These obser-
vations became the basis for the subsequent radical reform.
4.2 | NRP: Deembedding
Nissan's belief that keiretsu-style relations had become a lia-
bility led it to craft the NRP. At its announcement, Ghosn
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stated one maxim: “No sacred cows, no taboos, no con-
straints.” Nissan's expectations regarding the supplier had
changed dramatically, as summarized by a senior Nissan
purchasing manager:
The ability to deliver high quality products at a
low price now really has become the responsi-
bility of suppliers. Nissan is not willing to just
pour money into the suppliers anymore …
QCD [Quality Cost Delivery] is the basis of the
sourcing decision. The trend is very much dis-
crete: “Do you want this? You are in straight-
forward competition—best price, you get it;
otherwise, you won't.”
4.2.1 | Relationship
Nissan divested shares in all but four of 1,394 affiliated
firms (see Figure 1). During our interview with Ghosn in
2001, he reflected on shareholding in keiretsu times the fol-
lowing way:
Before, the relationships were confused by share-
holdings. You felt obliged to buy from a com-
pany because you owned part of this company.
Nissan further announced that the total number of compo-
nent suppliers would be reduced to 600. These remaining
suppliers were obliged to reduce the price of their parts
delivered to Nissan by 20% within three years. Our focal sup-
plier was even asked for a 26% price reduction of its compo-
nents. Also at the dyadic level radical changes were executed.
Pre-NRP practices of Nissan engineers aiding kaizen process
improvement activities at the supplier's facilities were abol-
ished. Likewise, Nissan no longer trained supplier personnel
at its own facilities. Furthermore, some supplier facilities near
Nissan factories were shut down by the supplier.
After-hours socializing among Nissan purchasers and
supplier representatives was banned by Nissan, which
severely affected personal relationships. Mid-year gifts
(o-chugen) traditionally exchanged in Japan with key busi-
ness contacts were shunned by Nissan, poignantly symboliz-
ing a rejection of the “Japanese way.” Such radical changes
earned Ghosn the nickname “keiretsu killer” (Nezu, 2000).
Ghosn made clear that preferential treatment of suppliers
was now deemed a bad practice. According to Ghosn:
Sourcing decisions in all categories will be strictly
based on credible performance commitment. This
clearly means that sourcing from our affiliates
will be no exception to this guideline.
In addition, Nissan's purchasing department was completely
overhauled. The previous structure with purchasers dedi-
cated to one specific supplier was replaced with purchasers
in charge of component groups. As a result of this system-
wide change, the supplier lost its champion at Nissan and
eventually had to negotiate with a French purchaser in Paris
who had broader knowledge of all offers in the field.
Because socialization between purchasers and supplier per-
sonnel was strictly forbidden during this period, in one
stroke, the supplier lost its access to information regarding
developments at Nissan.
Our interviewees at the supplier described the relation-
ship with Nissan as having changed from a parent–child
relationship to “having become adult” (otona ni natta). This
change was also reflected in the business language used.
During our interviews, we noted that interviewees at the sup-
plier referred to the pre-NRP period as Nissan “offering”
or “giving” them business; post-NRP, they talk about
“winning” business.
4.2.2 | Improvement and innovation initiatives
In its efforts to build a globally competitive supply base, Nis-
san committed itself to evaluating any supplier, incumbent,
and new, according to exactly the same standards. Our focal
supplier is a case in point. Nissan no longer promised to allo-
cate business, let alone guarantee survival, irrespective of the
supplier's performance. Instead, Nissan sequentially brought
in two new suppliers for this component (one immediately,
based in the United States, another two years later, based in
Europe). Nissan replaced its pre-NRP focus on manufacturing
excellence with a stringent focus on profit. By expanding its
supply base to new markets, Nissan hoped to further enhance
opportunities for both efficiency improvements as well as
innovation. According to a senior purchasing manager:
We have a very good manufacturing system we
should hold on to, but not at all costs. And that is
really what was happening… If we kept that pure
manufacturing focus rather than a business and a
profit focus, we wouldn't [be] building plants in
Chennai, in Morocco, in Russia—I doubt it. So I
think it [the NRP] has taken that focus away from
a pure manufacturing excellence.
The supplier responded immediately after the NRP had
taken effect by channeling its improvement activities into its
own “Survival Plan.” This plan was a strategic roadmap to
“design products that cost less.” First, the plan outlined the
supplier's increased contribution to product development and
design. Incorporating these value-added activities was paired
with building in-house capabilities in computer aided design
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(CAD). A manager at the supplier explained that before the
NRP, they relied on their second-tier suppliers for design.
After the NRP, they increased their investments in R&D and
prototyping. Second, the supplier's survival plan stipulated
efficiency enhancing improvement initiatives such as rede-
signing plant layouts, introducing manufacturing line flexi-
bility, implementing tightly synchronized material flows,
reducing inventories, as well as deploying zero-defect qual-
ity goals. These measures aimed at reducing direct labor cost
by 30% within three years. During the first year, a 16%
reduction in these costs was achieved, representing a large
efficiency gain while increasing output in the same period.
Third, the supplier consolidated its own supplier base. For
example, for a key component the supplier's own supply
base was reduced from 16 suppliers in 1999 to four in 2002.
Selection of second-tier suppliers was based not only on
price but also on technological capabilities. In addition, all
sub-suppliers now had to use CAD technology. Noncompli-
ance would trigger deselection, as stated by a supplier inter-
viewee in 2001.
These measures, combined with new buying alliances
with similar companies, were expected to reduce the sup-
plier's purchasing costs by 30% in the ensuing three years.
The implementation of the survival plan ultimately enabled
the supplier to achieve the 26% cost reduction demanded by
its key buyer Nissan. So, while Nissan strove for a broader
absorption of technology and searched for new partners, the
supplier exerted efforts to achieve efficiency improvement
and capability development geared toward becoming a via-
ble, self-reliant entity.
4.3 | Reembedding
A few years into the NRP, Nissan's more flexible and effi-
cient approach to supplier selection began to face the strain
of weakened coordination. One striking example was the
Japan-wide steel shortage in November 2004. Nissan's
domestic competitors all received their ordered quantities
and could continue production as planned (Ibison & Fifield,
2004). Nissan, however, had cut the number of steel sup-
pliers from five to two during the NRP and had drastically
decreased the volume purchased from its previous keiretsu
steel supplier to below 10% (Itoh, 2001). Consequently,
Nissan had to stop production at the three factories for five
days in November and December 2004 as its orders were not
fulfilled. This clearly showed a break with the past with
regards to supplier commitment to Nissan. A second impor-
tant reason for Nissan to seek intensified coordination was to
pursue its strategic aim of introducing 28 new models in the
period 2005–2008. Because of “cooled down” relations with
suppliers, Nissan feared it was missing out on information
that would spur cheaper production (Nikkei Industry Journal,
January 13, 2005). Consequently, Nissan became increasingly
concerned about reduced supplier responsiveness. According
to a senior Nissan purchasing official:
In the past … we could ask suppliers without a
commercial negotiation “Can you make sure that
you work Saturday morning this week because
we just had a breakdown?” or “We want to bring
some visitors around—sorry you got only half-
an-hour's notice—they'll be arriving at 4 o'clock.”
But we probably have seen some deterioration in
responsiveness to change. Now, it's a bit more
formal: “Who is paying for Saturday morning,
please, before we commit?” “Is this visitor really
important?” Or: “We are too busy, can we put it
off to next week?” Or: “Can't you tell him to go
see a different supplier?”
4.3.1 | Relationship
These developments triggered the second change in the rela-
tionship: a reappreciation of embedded ties with suppliers
announced by Ghosn at a meeting with suppliers on
November 18, 2004. According to Ghosn: “from now on, it
is necessary for Nissan to strengthen cooperative ties [with
suppliers]” (Nikkei Industry Journal, January 13, 2005).
Ghosn also publicly stated a reappreciation of the keiretsu
approach: “Not everything about the keiretsu was wrong. It
simply did not function properly at Nissan in the past. With
Nissan's subsidiaries, the keiretsu system was too cozy”
(Mikawa & Okudaira, 2005).
Subsequently, a number of initiatives were aimed at
strengthening the relationship with suppliers. First, through
the alliance supplier improvement program (ASIP), Nissan
began to offer specialized, on-site production process support
to its suppliers. Next, under the telling umbrella term of
THaNKS: (Trustful, Harmonious, Nissan Kaizen activities
with Suppliers) Nissan actively pursued strengthening rela-
tions with suppliers. Departing sharply from NRP practices
and returning to the keiretsu approach, these initiatives were
focused on achieving goals cooperatively. For example, Nis-
san explicitly stated improvement of trust with suppliers as a
goal of these efforts. It organized combined purchasing of
raw materials, shared transportation of parts, as well as sup-
plier access to its own logistics system. Notably, a central
tenet of the keiretsu approach made its comeback—at least on
paper: the benefits of improvements under the THaNKS ini-
tiative would be shared with suppliers on a 50:50 basis.
As a platform to foster renewed collaboration, Nissan
used the Renault Nissan Purchasing Organization (RNPO,
founded in 2001) made up of panels for all main automotive
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component groups. Selection procedures to become an
RNPO supplier were open to all suppliers—a policy in sup-
port of Nissan's wish for unrestricted, flexible, and global
selection. But once component panels were formed, Nissan
asserted a more collaborative stance. For example, to
encourage our focal supplier—who has been on the panel
since RNPO's inception—to invest in colocated facilities
abroad, Nissan offered contract packages for several facto-
ries in the same countries and recommended local partners
to the supplier with which joint ventures could be forged.
To further underscore its change in direction, Ghosn on
May 13, 2008, announced Nissan's third business plan post-
NRP, called Growth and Trust 2012 (GT2012). During the
presentation of GT2012, strong relationships with suppliers
were portrayed as the foundation from which Nissan would
improve its productivity.5
The supplier during this period opened 10 factories in the
direct vicinity of Nissan's global production facilities in
Asia, South America, and the United States. By way of com-
parison, during the five-year deembedding period they had
only opened one colocated factory in China. To build colo-
cated plants the supplier would turn to Nissan for assistance
in matters such as the acquisition of land and identifying
competitive second-tier suppliers. New supplier facilities
were mostly set up in joint ventures with partners suggested
by Nissan. According to our supplier interviewees, Nissan
recognized the cost involved in opening new production
facilities, and, in combination with a continuous cost reduc-
tion target, accepted “a certain kind of responsibility” by
typically ensuring business for at least five years.
During this time, the supplier also opened engineering
facilities in France close to the technical center of Nissan's
partner Renault. In Japan, the supplier started to attend design
and engineering meetings organized by Nissan at Nissan's
technical center. Amongst our supplier interviewees, the belief
that Nissan had regained technological capabilities that were
worthwhile learning from started to take root again. More-
over, they believed Nissan's initiatives to regain a close rela-
tionship were not only sincere, but would also directly benefit
the supplier because Nissan had successfully fended off its
crisis and seemed to be on a solid trajectory of recovery, par-
ticularly abroad. One supplier interviewee explained their
interest in renewed closeness to Nissan in the following way:
Before, [Nissan] purchasing people were very
lazy. With the arrival of Carlos Ghosn they all
changed their way of working dramatically. And
that was a very good thing for the company I
think, because Nissan is very profitable today.
Some of our interviewees at the supplier however were skepti-
cal about Nissan's attempts at closer coordination. They
viewed these initiatives as a Trojan horse that would give Nis-
san access to their facilities and information systems, which
they believed would be used to enforce further cost reduc-
tions. According to one of our interviewees at the supplier:
Nissan wants to have transparency to the sup-
plier, but not the other way. They want to have
transparency to find an opportunity for reduc-
ing costs. That's the motivation for asking us to
be transparent.
As exemplified by the two quotes above, supplier employees'
opinions on their firm's reembedding with Nissan were mixed.
Concluding, we see that despite the reservations, the supplier
took the opportunity to expand internationally alongside
Nissan and engaged more frequently and closely with Nissan.
4.3.2 | Improvement and innovation initiatives
In addition to Nissan's operational assistance to suppliers
abroad and in Japan, this period saw a more active exchange
of information with its suppliers. With regards to our focal
dyad, Nissan invited supplier employees to its technical cen-
ter for bilateral discussions on specific products alongside
general training and brainstorming sessions. At this time,
our interviewees at the supplier were no longer outright dis-
missive of Nissan's offers to dispatch engineers to their sites.
Importantly, the supplier's focus shifted to the needs of
the end customer—a change made clear in the supplier's
official “corporate philosophy” as featured in its brochures
and at its website. Consequently, Nissan and the supplier
geared their improvement and innovation initiatives toward
a common goal, customer satisfaction, they did not share
during the NRP period.
It should be noted, however, that during this time Nissan
did not relieve its cost pressure on the supplier. Final deci-
sions on supplier selection were made, as in the deembedding
period, based on tough cost performance and price criteria.
That being said, the RNPO panel membership embodied a
medium to longer-term oriented collaborative ethos rather
than the per-contract, transactional approach of the previous
period, to reflect the emerging belief that joint improvement
initiatives could benefit the relationship's performance.
4.4 | Synopsis: The three periods
The end of the embedding period was marked by ailing per-
formance for both Nissan and the supplier. During that time,
improvement as well as innovation initiatives by both partners
had stalled. Nissan narrowly focused (and enforced its sup-
plier's focus) on manufacturing excellence to the detriment of
innovation initiatives, resulting in poor cost performance and
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uncompetitive product design. The supplier was not able to
effectively forge substantial changes because it did not con-
tribute any new technologies. More radical innovations,
deemed disturbing to the relationship's status quo, were
shunned. Thus, neither partner strove to liberate the relation-
ship's deadlocked situation and generate more significant
innovations. With the relationship having settled in a mutually
acceptable—yet globally inferior—configuration, collabora-
tive initiatives were no longer sufficient to advance the rela-
tionship's performance, resulting in a worrisome decline.
We find that when embeddedness was temporarily
relaxed by the NRP, both partners were spurred to indepen-
dently search for improvement and innovation. Both suc-
ceeded in improving individual results, with Nissan enlisting
a broader set of suppliers that offered new technologies. The
supplier, in turn, was able to focus on advancing its own
R&D capabilities, to streamline its processes free of Nissan's
stifling protection, and to seek new customers. This indepen-
dent search performed by both partners unleashed creativity
and helped the relationship dissolve its deadlock.
As Nissan's post-NRP performance improvements started
to plateau, it sought to reembed its suppliers. Nissan could
no longer reap the benefits of coordinated actions and was
seeking to resume mutually aligned innovation initiatives.
According to a senior Nissan purchasing official:
We've bottomed out now in terms of the com-
petitive, destructible, short-term approach.… If
Nissan thinks it can survive, thrive, and prosper
at the expense of suppliers, then clearly that's
not the case.
Considering all three periods together, the temporary relaxa-
tion reinvigorated supply chain performance, because it
sparked improvement and innovation activity.
Clearly, Nissan did not revert to the identical pre-NRP
constellation during reembedding, which is not surprising
given technological change, demand shifts, turnover of key
personnel, and so forth that any firm would most likely face
during a 12-year period. Nonetheless, the keiretsu past was
deliberately invoked in Nissan's efforts to regain closer coor-
dination with suppliers. According to one of our Nissan
interviewees:
[Nissan is] starting to think about going back to
some of the pre-1999 long-term-ism rather than
what was subsequently. ... [There is] a realization
now that maybe we have exhausted the other
approach. And as these things tend to be quite
cyclical we start talking more about trust, more
about partnership, more about long-term relation-
ships. … It won't look like what we knew from
pre ‘99, but … there is a realization now that
we've caught up from a benchmark position and
we now need to decide how we can move for-
ward and how we can be far more constructive.
Patent data, despite its flaws (Cohen, 2010), may serve as a
proxy to depict the observed changed pattern of improve-
ment and innovation initiatives. Figure 2 plots the number of
patents Nissan and the supplier were granted for the focal
component during the timeframe. Especially when consider-
ing the relationship's total number of patents granted (dotted
curve), one can observe that the relationship's innovation
performance slowed to a minimum just prior to the 1999
NRP with a later recovery and rise until 2006.
The relationship's innovation performance is reflected
in bottom-line financial performances: Figure 3 illustrates
Nissan's turnaround in terms of both profits and revenues in
pre- and post-NRP years. Purchasing and supplier relation-
ships contributed the lion's share to this increase in profit.
For instance, during fiscal year 2002, net savings generated
by Nissan's purchasing initiatives were estimated by Ghosn
to be 227 billion yen. The supplier's profitability had been
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ailing during the 1990s and faded briefly with the NRP,
resulting in a net debt for the first time in its history in 2001
and 2002. Yet, improvement initiatives helped the supplier
recover, and even surpass, its pre-NRP profit levels from
2003 onward. Thus, Nissan's recovery was not merely
resulting from a zero-sum game at the cost of the supplier.
Rather, performance improved for both members of the
relationship.6
Based on this synopsis of the three periods, we formulate
the following proposition:
Proposition 1: A temporary relaxation of buyer–
supplier embeddedness can aid overall supply
chain performance via reinvigorated improve-
ment and innovation initiatives.
Culminating in Proposition 1, the case offers important
insights into the deembedding phenomenon. Yet, the case
alone leaves open important questions of how often, how
long, and at what intensity temporary deembedding helps.
Therefore, by complementing the case with a simulation
model, we aim to generalize and augment the theory we
built on the deembedding phenomenon. Importantly, this
model is grounded in the case by capturing the following
core elements of the case study: (a) the complex technolog-
ical environment that the focal supply chain faces, (b) a
supply chain relationship that can be either in an embedded
or in a deembedded state, and (c) the phenomenon of tem-
porary deembedding.
5 | A COMPUTATIONAL
SIMULATION MODEL OF
DEEMBEDDING
Our model is grounded in the case and parsimoniously rep-
resents its core elements: (a) a supply chain's search on a
complex technological environment by using canonical per-
formance landscapes, (b) the supply chain is constituted by a
relationship between a buyer firm and a supplier firm in
either an embedded or a deembedded state, and; (c) tempo-
rary deembedding is a dynamic process that changes an
embedded supply chain relationship into a deembedded
and then back to a reembedded one. In the following, we
describe how these three core elements are operationalized
in our model.
5.1 | Supply chain search on a performance
landscape
We build a variant of Kauffman's (1993) NK model to repre-
sent a supply chain's search for performance in a complex
technological environment. The NK model is a widely used
method to model complex organizational problem solving
(e.g., Chandrasekaran et al., 2015; Giannoccaro, 2011;
Giannoccaro & Nair, 2016; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005).
In our application of this model, N represents the number
of decisions made in the supply chain. For instance, one
typical decision could consider the material flows at the
first-tier supplier to be organized following a push or pull
logic. In another decision, the buyer undertakes quality
controls.
Following the standard NK model, each of these deci-
sions di is assumed to be binary, that is, di 2 {0, 1}, for
i = 1, …, N. In a supply chain context, decisions such as
these are typically distributed between suppliers and buyers.
For the sake of parsimony, we assume that the supplier has
to make the first N/2 decisions dS = (d1, …, di, …, dN/2),
whereas the buyer exercises the other N/2 decision dB =
(dN/2 + 1, …, di, …, dN) Supply chain performance is a func-
tion of both parties' decisions, formally P(dS, dB), and will be
specified next.
To measure a supply chain's overall performance, how-
ever, the parties' decisions cannot be considered in isolation.
Rather, decisions may interact nontrivially. For instance, a
workflow option at the supplier may affect the decision
about quality control at the buyer's end. More generally
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speaking, the supply chain's technological anatomy may be
highly complex with many interacting decisions or less com-
plex with sparse interactions. In the complex case, we speak
of rugged technology landscapes, and in the simpler case of
smooth technology landscapes. Formally, interactions
between decisions are captured by K, the second parameter
featured in the standard NK model. Let pi be the perfor-
mance contribution of each decision that depends not only
on its own specification di but also on the value of K other
specifications as signified by the vector d−i = (di1, …, diK).
Note that the specific interactions may well cut across the
firms' boundaries, that is, the contribution of one of the sup-
plier's decisions may depend on one (or more) decisions of
the buyer (and vice versa). For every possible specification
of (di1, … , diK), a random draw from a standardized uni-
form distribution determines the performance contribution
pi(di, d−i), that is, pi(di, d−i)~U[0,1]. The overall supply
chain performance is the average of all supplier and all buyer
decisions' contributions. Formally, the overall supply chain
performance function P(dS, dB) maps both parties' decisions
onto a one-dimensional supply chain performance variable:
P dS,dBð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Supply chain
performance
= PB dS, dBð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Buyer0s
performance
+ PS dS, dBð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Supplier0s
performance
=
XN=2
i = 1
p di,d− ið Þ
N=2
+
XN
i = N=2 + 1
p di,d− ið Þ
N=2
:
In each period t, the firms carry out search sequentially.
Each search randomly chooses one decision di, evaluates if
changing specification (from 0 to 1, or vice versa) improves per-
formance, and updates the configuration in the case of gains.
Next, the other firm carries out its search, this cycle being
repeated during T periods where T represents the time-to-market
pressure of the search.
5.1.1 | Embedded and deembedded
relationships
Both our literature review and case observation character-
ize an embedded relationship as attending to the other
party's objectives: each firm considers not only how its
decisions will affect its own performance but also how its
acts will influence the results of the other firm's decisions.
For example, in the embedded period, Nissan and the sup-
plier engaged in collaborative kaizen programs that were
geared to offer joint gains to both firms. In the model,
embedded firms likewise search for supply chain-wide per-
formance improvements on behalf of the supplier's perfor-
mance objective OemS and for the buyer's performance
objective OemB formally expressed as:
OemB ds, dBð Þ = OemS dS, dBð Þ = P dS, dBð Þ:
In contrast, a deembedded firm gauges solely how its
choices will affect its own results. Here, when the supplier
and the buyer search the landscape, they will adhere to par-
tial objective functions. As our focal relationship deem-
bedded, Nissan and the supplier strove for improving their
own performance by nurturing new capabilities (e.g., modu-
larizing platforms and prototyping, respectively); those initia-
tives did not aim at improving the supply chain performance
between Nissan and the supplier. Formally, when a supplier
and a buyer are in a deembedded relationship, the supplier
(and the buyer, respectively) evaluate decisions based on
internal respective performance objectives OdeS O
de
B
 
, which
are defined by the respective (individual) performances7:
OdeS = PS dS,dBð Þ =
XN=2
i = 1
p di,d− ið Þ
N=2
6¼
OdeB = PB dS, dBð Þ =
XN
i = N=2 + 1
pi di,d− ið Þ
N=2
:
5.1.2 | The deembedding process
Deembedding the supply chain refers to shifting a relation-
ship from an embedded (default) state into a deembedded
state. When this shift happens, supply chain members no
longer search for mutual benefits but only for their own. For
a given period t, the supply chain becomes deembedded with
probability δ—referred to as inclination to deembed. To
broaden the perspective from our single case and to unearth
the performance tradeoffs tied to varying inclinations to
deembed, this strategic variable will be systematically varied
such that δ 2 [0, 1]. As a default in the baseline model, the
deembedded supply chain is reembedded (i.e., resumes the
embedded state) after one period. However, later we also
investigate the duration of deembedding.
Our notion of deembedding as a tunable probability has
three important advantages. First, it provides a parsimonious
representation of relationship deembedding free of designing
specific policies that is more in-line with ideal agent-based
modeling. Second, this representation accords well with the
search notion from complexity theory, which argues that
organizational decision-making is not perfectly rational,
transpiring via simple heuristics such as probabilistic deci-
sion rules (Cyert & March, 1963). Third, as our goal is to
characterize supply chain performance effects from a conser-
vative angle, we are chiefly interested in the theoretical
advantages and disadvantages of deembedding events that
STING ET AL. 125
may occur stochastically. We thus sidestep having to tailor
(perhaps improperly) an “optimal” rule for deembedding the
supply chain. In the robustness section, we investigate a
model extension that is built around the special case of
deembedding contingent on a standstill in performance.
5.2 | Simulation results
We implemented the model described above in Matlab and
ran 10,000 replications of each experimental instance. When
not specified otherwise, we parameterized the NK technol-
ogy landscape with N = 12 and K = 6. While this para-
meterization clearly does not capture the magnitude and
complexity of real-world supply chain decision-making, it
allows us to represent sufficiently complex behavior that can
still be managed computationally (cf. Chandrasekaran et al.,
2015). Allowing for a replication of our results (also through
replicative coding in other programming languages), we
included a pseudocode of our model in the Appendix B. All
presented performance figures are statistically robust in that
they exhibit sufficiently small standard errors (<0.001)—too
small to be meaningfully displayed in the ensuing perfor-
mance graphs.
5.2.1 | The performance implications of
deembedding for supply chain search
Figure 4 shows supply chain performance (P, depicted on
the y-axis) as a function of the (varied) inclination to
deembed the relationship (δ, depicted on the x-axis). The
two curves characterize an environment of moderate
(T = 100) versus high (T = 50) time-to-market pressure.
Starting from an ever-embedded supply chain (δ = 0), we
observe that a small increase in δ provides steep performance
gains for the supply chain for both time-to-market-pressures.
A maximum performance is reached at δ = 20% for both
time-to-market pressures. High time-to-market pressure, how-
ever, takes a toll on performance because less time is
available for search. Post-peak performance drops with incli-
nation to deembed the supply chain. While the performance
effects are more pronounced for moderate time-to-market
pressure, both performance curves trace an inverse U-shaped
pattern where a modest, positive inclination to deembed
appears most effective.
Why does a temporarily deembedded supply chain search
improve overall performance? Search theory has shown that
organizational adaptation on complex landscapes may even-
tually freeze (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003) as organizations
reach a “sticking point.” In the single organization setting,
organizational search halts on a local hill where any small
move would deteriorate performance. We also know that
freezing on inferior configurations proves more likely and
becomes especially damaging when organizations face more
complex search environments on more rugged landscapes
(Levinthal, 1997).
In our interorganizational setting that embraces a dyadic
relationship of two firms, search activities across the entire
supply chain may likewise freeze, particularly when neither
buyer nor supplier can identify specific actions that would
advance the relationship en bloc. Such a scenario transpired
with Nissan and its first-tier suppliers during the overem-
beddedness period. Here, the supply chain relationship
seemed to be stuck in deadlock as evidenced by declining
innovation advances in Figure 2. At the same time, it is also
possible that deembedding the supply chain relationship
reshapes how the supply chain deals with sticking points. To
probe this further, we ran another experiment in which we
varied the complexity of the supply chain's environment,
exploring both lower complexity (K = 2) and higher com-
plexity (K = 10).
Figure 5 details results of the simulation experiment in
which we varied the complexity of the supply chain under
moderate time-to-market pressure (T = 100). To compare per-
formance across complexity levels, the y-axis plots a relative
supply-chain performance gain or loss that a deembedding
supply chain (with varying δ) has above or below an ever-
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embedded supply chain (δ = 0) facing identical degrees of
complexity (K2{2,6,10}). This relative perspective allows us
to focus on the performance gains delivered by deembedding
normalized for each complexity level. Notably, previous
research has established that complexity also generally affects
performance levels in NK fitness landscapes via (a) different
likelihoods for local peaks and valleys, and (b) the various
expected performance heights and depths for such local posi-
tions (Levinthal, 1997). Therefore, we isolate the effects of
deembedding from the other (known) effects of complexity.
Two results from Figure 5 are particularly striking. First,
the performance gain from deembedding is higher in environ-
ments of higher complexity. This can be seen where the
K = 10 performance curve dominates the K = 6 performance
curve sitting atop the K = 2 performance curve. Second, the
most effective inclination to deembed increases (shifting right-
ward in Figure 5) with complexity: For K = 2, it is at about
6%; for K = 6, gains peak near 20%; for K = 10, benefits pla-
teau at around 40%. Moreover, for lower levels of complexity,
performance gains plunge more quickly with higher deembed-
ding. For K = 2, increasing the deembedding inclination
beyond 50% would even reduce supply chain performance
below that of an ever-embedded supply chain (as signified by
performance losses with the high inclination to separate).
The first result highlights that deembedding is more effec-
tive when complexity is high, that is, when it is more likely
for the supply chain to find itself in deadlock on a local per-
formance hill. In such a scene, deembedding temporarily
relaxes the strong ties between the relationship partners. Then,
both the supplier and the buyer no longer pursue chain-wide
performance but they independently search for self-improve-
ment. By doing so, they make decisions that may harm the
supply chain as a whole in the short term while prodding the
relationship to escape a local optimum to advance in the long
term. Thus, deembedding can broaden the entire supply-chain
search. Because the supply chain reembeds after the deem-
bedding, the aligned supply chain partners will again make
decisions to smooth out prior misaligned actions. However,
the creative impulse obtained from deembedding moves the
supply chain forward from past local sticking points. This
mechanisms of broadened search well befits the more radical
improvement initiatives that Nissan and its suppliers under-
took when their relation was deembedded.
The second result highlights that while deembedding may
improve supply chain performance, it comes at a cost when
used excessively. This cost results from the loss of alignment
between the buyers' and suppliers' decisions. As they pursue
independent improvements fitting their own objectives, incom-
patible paths may result. Deembedding costs are embodied
in the waning (and even negative) postpeak trajectories in
Figure 5. Here, too-frequent deembedding spawns mismatches
that hamper supply chain performance. Under low complexity,
the advantage of broader search via deembedding is limited,
and the cost of deembedding quickly counteracts any benefits.
5.2.2 | Duration and intensity of deembedding
So far, we have assumed that deembedding lasts for one
period (D = 1) where the deembedding features a complete
cut of ties between the supplier and buyer. In order to shed
light on the effects of both duration and intensity of deembed-
ding, we now relax these two assumptions. First, we let deem-
bedding take a tunable duration of D > 1 periods, that is,
after the firms stay deembedded more than one period before
they resume into an embedded relationship (i.e., reembed-
ding). Second, within deembedded periods, the supply chain
members will not totally cut ties. Rather, they will entertain a
subset of decisions J2{0,...,N} whose contributions may be
jointly considered in the respective performance objectives
OdeS and O
de
B that they seek to improve. Here, the intensity of
a deembedding can be characterized by 1-J/N. When J = 0,
the intensity is 100% because there is no overlap in the
objectives, whereas if J = N, intensity is 0% and the supply
chain will stay embedded as the objectives of buyer and sup-
plier match. Figure 6 portrays the results of this relaxation
upon supply chain performance for T = 100 and K = 6
under tuned duration-intensity combinations. Deembedding
is most effective when implemented in the form of short and
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intense periods, as seen for the dominating curve with
D = 1 and 100% intensity. With a brief, intense deembed-
ding strategy, the supply chain strikes an effective trade-off:
the supply chain enjoys creativity unleashed by intense
periods of deembedded search, while not losing much time
that is required for recoordinating these initiatives through
successive reembedding efforts.
To summarize, our simulation reinforces the main finding
of the case study; thereby it lends further validity to the simu-
lation model and generalizes our case insights by unearthing
how temporary deembedding affects search as a mechanism
for supply chain performance (Proposition 1). Furthermore,
the simulation-based results augment theory, giving rise to
propositions on (a) how frequently deembedding should occur
to improve performance (Proposition 2), (b) how technologi-
cal complexity interacts with the performance gains of deem-
bedding (Proposition 3), and (c) how long and intense the
deembedding periods should be (Proposition 4).
Proposition 2: There is an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the inclination to deembed
and supply chain performance where a small
inclination is most effective for supply chain
performance.
Proposition 3: Temporary deembedding is
more beneficial to supply chain performance in
more complex technology landscapes.
Proposition 4: Short and intense periods of deem-
bedding offer higher performance gains than pro-
longed or less intense periods of deembedding.
5.3 | Model extensions and robustness
analyses
In order to address specific “what-if” questions and to broaden
the perspective obtained from the case, we explored a number
of model extensions. The first extension addresses the ques-
tion of how deembedding would affect supply chain perfor-
mance, if it was only triggered in response to a performance
standstill. This question is relevant for our case, because
although deembedding was motivated by disappointing sup-
ply chain wide performances, it was not immediately linked
in chronological terms. Only after the alliance with Renault,
when it had already been in standstill for nearly a decade, did
Nissan trigger deembedding. To examine the special case of
deembedding contingent on poor performance, we devised a
model extension in which deembedding can only be triggered
when there has been no movement in supply chain search and
so performance came to a halt in the previous period. For-
mally, in any period t that follows a performance standstill
such that P(d(t − 1)) = P(d(t − 2)), deembedding may occur
with probability δ. Two important yet intuitively expected
implications are obtained from this extension, as illustrated in
Figure 7. First, deembedding continues to create value when
triggered contingent on standstill (Proposition 1); if implemen-
table, such a practice would even outperform our base model.
This is because the supply chain is deembedded just when it
can help reinvigorate search. Second, the characteristic perfor-
mance curve of deembedding remains (Proposition 2), yet its
downside part appears less pronounced. This result is because
deembedding takes effect only following a performance stand-
still and so cannot harm efforts to ensure compatibility after
deembedding as much.
The second extension examines the counter-factual case
of a supplier unwilling and/or incapable to reembed in our
case study. We observed in fact that the supplier was ini-
tially skeptical to reembed, but eventually joined Nissan's
reembedding efforts. Therefore, we devised a model where
the supplier stays deembedded even when the buyer reem-
beds, that is, the supplier's search objective remains the indi-
vidual goal OdeS rather than reverting back to the supply
chain wide goal OemS . Figure 7 illustrates that a supplier
unwilling to reembed imposes a deadweight loss on supply
chain performance when compared to our base model.
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Two factors drive this disadvantage: (a) the supplier's reem-
bedding is required to guarantee compatibility of bilateral
search efforts, and (b) future deembedding will be less
impactful because the supplier stays deembedded. A way
out of this dilemma, one could conjecture, is that the buyer
compensates the buyer to reembed, but more field and
model-based research is needed to examine that approach.
In our third model extension, we delve into the question of
whether our key insights on deembedding remain when con-
sidering systemic deembedding (i.e., altering the relations
with all suppliers in the supply base) instead of our dyadic
focus (affecting only the focal buyer–supplier relationship).
We thus deliberately depart from our unit of analysis and
extend the simulation model by first incorporating a supply chain
with two suppliers (each making N/4 decisions dS1, and dS2,
respectively, while the buyer still owns N/2 decisions dB). Build-
ing on that first variation, we also devised a second variation
where one of the two suppliers may be replaced when deem-
bedding occurs. That means that one of the supplier's con-
figuration dS1 or dS2 (with equal chances) may be entirely
changed after deembedding. Both variations with two sup-
pliers offer the same inverse U-shaped patterns as regards to
supply chain performance (see Figure 7).
To summarize, we examined three relevant what-if sce-
narios that generalize the contingencies of our case study.
While these extensions give rise to intricate performance
nuances of deembedding under new scenarios, they all rein-
force our key findings regarding the benefits of temporary
deembedding and so lend further robustness to our theory
building.
6 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research investigates the phenomenon of temporary
deembedding as a dynamic strategy to manage supply chain
relationships and analyzes how temporary deembedding
may influence supply chain performance. A longitudinal case
study of Nissan's relationship with a strategic first-tier supplier
showed that temporary deembedding reinvigorated both
parties' improvement and innovation initiatives to the better-
ment of the relationship's performance. Evidence from this
buyer–supplier case indicates that prior close embedding led
to a deadlocked performance that neither partner's innova-
tive efforts could dispel. Deembedding stirred the relation-
ship, enabling both Nissan and the supplier to shape their
own improvement initiatives, which enabled the supply
chain to break free of its deadlock. Later efforts to reembed
the supply chain enhanced coordination that restored the
compatibility of distributed initiatives. To validate our case
findings and augment our theory building, we forged a parsi-
monious simulation model using complexity theory and its
fundamental notion of search (Levinthal, 1997). The simula-
tion experiments generalize our main finding that benefits
arise from temporarily relaxing embeddedness between
buyers and suppliers (Proposition 1). The simulations aug-
ment this finding in a threefold way. First, deembedding
harms supply chain performance when pursued too often
(Proposition 2). Second, deembedding benefits supply chain
performance especially in environments subject to high tech-
nological complexity (Proposition 3). Third, short but intense
deembedding is most effective for enhancing supply chain
performance (Proposition 4).
6.1 | Theoretical implications
Taken together, the case and simulation results feature three
contributions to supply chain management research. First,
we offer new theoretical insights on how to manage buyer–
supplier relationships—a research topic hotly debated. For
example, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) highlight the supply
chain-wide benefits of aligning buyer–supplier aims through
revenue-sharing contracts. In a similar vein, Dyer and col-
leagues argue that embedded relationships comprised the
main factor driving the competitive advantage of Japanese
manufacturers over their American counterparts (Dyer, 1996;
Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998).
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Likewise, research on supply chain innovation advocates
close, prolonged involvement of suppliers in new product
development processes (e.g., Clark, 1989; Yan & Dooley,
2013, 2014). In contrast, our case and simulation findings
suggest that an overly embedded relationship can impede sup-
ply chain innovation and performance. This finding is in-line
with later research that has documented excessive embedded-
ness as a liability (e.g., Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Swink &
Zsidisin, 2006; Villena et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2014). This
latter stream of research concludes that firms should avoid
overly embedded ties and strive for a balanced degree of
embeddedness. Yet, it has remained unclear how firms can
achieve such a balanced level of embeddedness. We contrib-
ute to this discussion by building knowledge on how firms,
by temporary deembedding their relationships, can dynami-
cally achieve an effective balance. Our study thus challenges
the implicit rigidity assumption that has plagued SCM and so
opens up a new research avenue that conceptualizes buyer–
supplier embeddedness as a dynamic phenomenon.
Second, we link our notion of dynamic embedding to the
concept of search from complexity theory. We do so by dem-
onstrating how temporary deembedding influences trajectories
and outcomes of supply chain-wide search in our case and
simulation. Prior research on the dark side of embedded rela-
tionships proposes excessive opportunistic behavior as an
explanation for the detrimental effects of over-embeddedness
(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Villena et al., 2011). In contrast,
our search perspective suggests that even when supply chain
members attend to each other's needs perfectly free of oppor-
tunism, embeddedness beyond a certain threshold locks both
organizations into improvement initiatives that offer mutually
acceptable, yet only incremental, performance improvements.
Our search perspective also qualifies prior research that seeks
to optimize supply chain relationships through formal models
(e.g., Cachon & Lariviere, 2005). Due to the complexity of
supply chain decision-making, it is oftentimes difficult—if
not impossible—to formulate “optimal” masterplans for buyer–
supplier relationships. Instead, the search perspective acknowl-
edges this complexity and conceptualizes supply chains as
a setting where imperfectly rational decision-makers jointly
and iteratively search for improvements and innovations
(e.g., Chandrasekaran et al., 2015; Giannoccaro, 2011; Kim
et al., 2015; Sting & Loch, 2016).
Third, our view explicitly recognizes the agency of firms
in deliberately and strategically tuning their supply chain rela-
tionships. Prior research associates a level of embeddedness
with performance outcomes, or sees embeddedness as evolv-
ing only within a natural course. For example, Jap and Ander-
son (2007) and Vanpoucke et al. (2014) empirically tested
how relationship characteristics vary across predefined phases
of a relationship's life-cycle. Saavedra et al. (2008) and Burt
(2001, 2002) investigated gradually diminishing relationships
over time. These approaches assume structurally determined
embeddedness: firms' relationships with suppliers either
remain relatively stable or evolve in a presaged course that
leaves little room for endogenous relationship changes. By
contrast, we propose an agency view of buyer–supplier ties,
which conceptualizes firms as strategic players actively shap-
ing their relationships. This view pioneers new research paths
for exploring change in supply chain interactions as an endog-
enous and discretionary process.
6.2 | Managerial implications
Our study offers important insights for managerial practice.
These insights follow directly from the propositions put
forth in this article, as shown in Table 2. First, supply chain
managers do not have to view embeddedness as a one-time
choice. Rather, they can revise the embeddedness of buyer–
TABLE 2 Linking propositions with managerial implications
Theoretical finding
(propositions) Managerial implication
Temporary relaxation of
buyer–supplier
embeddedness can aid
overall supply chain
performance via
reinvigorated improvement
and innovation initiatives.
Managers do not have to view
supply chain embeddedness
as a one-time choice but as a
dynamic and malleable
process over which they
have agency.
Temporary deembedding
should be adopted as a
strategic tool of buyer–
supplier relationship
management.
There is an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the
inclination to deembed and
supply chain performance
where a small inclination is
most effective for supply
chain performance.
Temporary deembedding can
offer supply chain wide
innovation gains, but too
much deembedding causes
supply chain
incompatibilities.
Temporary deembedding is
more beneficial to supply
chain performance when
technology landscapes are
more complex.
Despite the received wisdom
that “more complexity calls
for more coordination,” close
coordination under
complexity might actually
“freeze” the relationship in a
deadlock. Deembedding (and
so temporarily reduced
coordination) can break this.
Short and intense periods of
deembedding offer higher
performance gains than
prolonged or less intense
periods of deembedding.
Deembedding is most effective
when executed in a short and
intense way.
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supplier relationships dynamically. Our study notably shows
how temporary deembedding can reinvigorate capability
improvements which, in turn, can benefit supply chain per-
formance. As illustrated in our case study, firms can
deembed by selling their equity holdings in the supplier;
dedicating purchasers to components rather than to sup-
pliers; diversifying business across several alternative sup-
pliers; curbing close friendships with suppliers, and;
clarifying standards that govern the relationship, among
many other measures. Firms need to reverse such structural
and relational efforts when reembedding. However, reem-
bedding in the cognitive dimension can be particularly diffi-
cult. This dimension encompasses shared meaning, defined
rules, and set roles in the relationship. When these are
altered drastically as part of intense deembedding, resumed
realignment may not be straightforward.
Second, our investigation of the duration, intensity, and
frequency of temporary deembedding can also inform sup-
ply chain decision-making. Intuition calls for more coordina-
tion between supply chain members in more complex
environments. This is due to increased technological interde-
pendence among decisions of buyers and suppliers. Our
results qualify this intuition by adding a dynamic perspec-
tive. Particularly in complex environments, the supply
chain's search for innovation is more likely to get stuck
because there are more technological interdependencies to
consider, which further paralyze search. Deembedding the
relationship can thus offer additional performance benefits
due to its ability to unleash innovation by all supply chain
members. By temporarily deembedding interdependent
efforts at the buyer and supplier, supply chain management
can strike an effective balance between the coordination
advantages of tight collaboration (in an embedded relation-
ship) and the innovation advantages of distributed initiatives
(in a temporary deembedded relationship). Yet, engaging in
deembedding too frequently or staying deembedded for too
long leads to incompatible search outcomes, which in turn
can hurt supply chain performance.
6.3 | Limitations
The main limitation of our study is that our inductive case
study relied on one specific buyer–supplier relationship. In
order to triangulate how embeddedness evolved over time
and to strengthen internal validity of our case findings, we
incorporated secondary data (e.g., equity ownership in the
supplier and patent data). These secondary data show pat-
terns consistent to what we find in our case. Furthermore,
we confirmed with our Nissan interviewees that our observa-
tions were not specific to the particular component we stud-
ied. Most importantly, our research design combines an
inductive case study with agent-based simulations in order
to generalize and augment our understanding of the deem-
bedding phenomenon and its mechanisms.
Moreover, at first glance it seemed that Nissan reacted to
poor supply chain performance by deembedding the rela-
tionship with the supplier. However, our analysis suggests
that a timely response was not the case. In fact, supply chain
performance had been ailing for several years before the
NRP. Therefore, without making strong assumptions about
the ability to detect poor performance, the base model
describes a process that may repeatedly probe the relation-
ship. The model, consequently, offers the generalizable and
robust insight that short but intense temporary deembedding
improves supply chain performance even under imperfect
monitoring and response. In our model extension, we
observe that performance-contingent deembedding would
boost performance even further. A repeated probing of rela-
tionships gives rise to a dynamic pattern of punctuated equi-
libria; where periods of standstill are trailed by periods of
reinvigorated search. That said, more field and modeling
research is needed to fully understand whether, and if so,
how, the timing of deembedding can be optimized.
Finally, absent broader cross-industry and cross-country
analyses that empirically test and further generalize our con-
clusions, our advice on deembedding should be considered
with caution. Still, we are confident that our findings pave
the way for scholars to develop further insights to support
the dynamic and malleable view of buyer–supplier relation-
ships that we propose here.
ENDNOTES
1 We reviewed all articles on buyer–supplier relationships published
between 2006 and 2016 in leading operations and management jour-
nals: Journal of Operations Management, Production and Operations
Management, International Journal of Operations & Production Man-
agement, Management Science, Strategic Management Journal,
Academy of Management Journal, and Administrative Science
Quarterly.
2 The dyad discussed in this article is part of a larger data set consisting
of Nissan; seven of its first-tier suppliers; and two of its second-tier
suppliers that was used in Stevens et al., 2015 to discuss trust in
buyer–supplier relationships.
3 Kei is used to signal group membership. It is the same Japanese char-
acter kei as the first syllable in keiretsu, and means “linked.” Looked
at from the supplier perspective, this affiliation is exclusive; suppliers
are not affiliated with more than one OEM. It is based on the history
of the supplier and generally does not change over time, even when
the customer base of the supplier changes.
4 Stiff competition and surging demand forced Nissan to reluctantly
purchase this technology from its major competitor Toyota. Nissan's
first hybrid electric vehicle, the Nissan Altima hybrid, was introduced
in 2007 carrying the Toyota technology.
5 Due to the global financial crisis, GT2012 was suspended by Nissan
less than a year later in February 2009.
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6 To honor the supplier's request to remain anonymous, we do not dis-
close its profits and revenues here.
7 Note that, as a result, deembedding does not constrain the firms'
search scope but only their objectives. That is, formally, both firms
always search on all of their N/2 decisions. This representation is
grounded in our case relationship, where neither member's search
domain was affected by the deembedding or by reembedding.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1. What is the main part/system your department purchases from your suppliers?
2. How many Nissan employees are currently in the RNPO supplier panel of this part?
3. How many suppliers are currently in the panel for this part/system?
4. What percentage of sourcing of this part/system is done by your main supplier?
5. In what year did your relation with the supplier start?
6. Please comment on your main reasons for selecting the supplier.
7. In what way is Nissan involved in the design of this part/system?
8. In what way is Nissan involved in the manufacturing of this part/system?
9. In what way is the supplier involved in the design of this part/system?
10. In what way is the supplier involved in the manufacturing of this part/system?
11. Do face-to-face meetings take place between Nissan and the supplier? If so, how often, and which departments/divisions participate in these meetings?
12. If you have a contract with the supplier, could you please indicate the duration (in months or years) as well as the main outline of this contract?
13. Does Nissan provide the supplier with raw materials?
14. Does Nissan provide the supplier with equipment?
15. Does Nissan provide the supplier with management training?
16. Does Nissan provide the supplier with technical training?
17. Does Nissan provide the supplier with financial support?
18. Do joint improvement projects take place between Nissan and the supplier?
19. Does joint product design take place between Nissan and the supplier?
20. Please indicate the degree of financial participation of Nissan in the supplier.
21. Please indicate the extent of dedication of the assets of the supplier to Nissan.
22. If you have a formal contract with the supplier, please indicate its importance.
23. What is the level of integration of IT systems between Nissan and the supplier (for example ERP)?
24. Please comment on your main reasons for selecting the supplier.
25. Does Nissan invite the supplier to meetings such as kyoryokukai?
26. Did you ask the supplier for extra-contractual cost reductions in the past ten years? If so, how did the supplier succeed in achieving these? Did your company
assist the supplier?
27. Does Nissan share cost savings resulting from joint improvements with the supplier?
28. Does Nissan reimburse raw material costs to the supplier in case orders are cancelled?
29. To what extent is the supplier responsive to change in its relation with Nissan?
30. To what extent is Nissan responsive to change in its relation with the supplier?
31. To what extent is the supplier willing to invest in the QCD performance of Nissan?
32. To what extent is Nissan willing to invest in the QCD performance of the supplier?
33. Please indicate the level of dedication of the supplier to its relation with Nissan.
34. Please indicate the level of dedication of Nissan to its relation with the supplier.
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APPENDIX B: PSEUDOCODE OF THE NK MODEL SIMULATION
Basic model pseudocode
Require 0 < K < N, T δ,D
for 0 < i ≤ N do
d−i  sample K indices from {1, … , N}\i
pi(di, d−i)  2K + 1 draws from U(0, 1)
end for
for all s 2 {{0, 1}N} do
P dð Þ  PNi = 1 pi di, d− ið ÞN
end for
d(0)  random draw from {0, 1}N
Create the technology landscape and initial supply chain configuration
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T do
u  random draw from U(0, 1)
if u > δ then
d(t + 1)  EMBEDDED_SEARCH()
else
for 1 ≤ τ ≤ D do
d(t + 1)  DEEMBEDDED_SEARCH()
end for t = t + 1
end if
Supply chain search oscillates between embedded (default) and deembedded states
return P(dT) Return simulation output after T periods
EMBEDDED_SEARCH()
dS  d(t)|[1, … , N/2]
dS t + 1ð Þ  SUPPLIERSEARCH dS, dB,OemS = P
 Þ
dB  d(t)|[N/2 + 1, … , N]
dB t + 1ð Þ  BUYERSEARCHðdS t + 1ð Þ, OemB = P
 
d(t + 1)  (dS(t + 1), dB(t + 1))
return d(t + 1)
Embedded search is geared toward improving supply chain performance P
Pseudocode for deembedded search geared toward members' own objectives
DEEMBEDDED_SEARCH()
dS  d(t)|[1, … , N/2]
OdeS =
PN=2
i = 1
pi di, d− ið Þ
N=2
dS t + 1ð Þ  SUPPLIERSEARCH dS,dB,OdeS
 
dB  d(t)|[N/2 + 1, … , N]
OdeB =
PN
i = N=2 + 1
pi di, d− ið Þ
N=2
dB t + 1ð Þ  BUYERSEARCH dS t + 1ð Þ, dB,OdeS
 
d(t + 1)  (dS(t + 1), dB(t + 1))
return d(t + 1)
Deembedded search is geared toward improving members' own performance objectives
Define supplier's deembedded objective
Define supplier's deembedded objective
SUPPLIER_SEARCH(dS,dB,O)
d0  dS
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N/2 do
i = random draw from {1, … , N/2}
d00  d0
if d00i = 1 then
d00i = 0
else
d00i = 1
end if
if O (d00, dB) > O(d0) then
d0  d00
end if
end for
return d0
BUYER_SEARCH(dS,dB,O)
d0  dB
for 1 ≤ n ≤ N/2 do
i = random draw from {N/2 + 1, … , N}
d00  d0
if d00i = 1 then
d00i = 0
else
d00i = 1
end if
if O(dS, d00) > O(d0) then
d0  d00
end if
end for
return d0
STING ET AL. 135
